by
Slayton, Robert A.
Call Number
358.40092
Publication Date
2010
Summary
In 1948, just as the Cold War was settling into the form it would maintain for nearly half a century, major antagonists the US and the USSR began maneuvering into a series of dangerously hostile encounters. Trouble had broken out in Poland and Czechoslovakia, but it was in Germany, which had been at the heart of World Wars One and Two, that the first potentially explosive confrontation developed. The USSR, which had suffered more at Germany's hands than the rest of the Allies combined, may have viewed developments there with heightened fear and irritability. When the western Allies moved to co.
Format:
Electronic Resources
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3.2787
by
Vick, Alan.
Call Number
355.130973 21
Publication Date
2002
Summary
To better understand the requirement for strategic responsiveness, as well as what is achievable, this study sought to answer the following questions: Can the Air Force meet the Army's 4-day deployment goal? What combination of deployment and basing options would maximize the strategic responsiveness of new Army forces? How much unambiguous warning does the United States usually have before it initiates military operations? How much of this time will civilian decisionmakers typically consume in their deliberations before ordering deployment of military forces? Are large U.S. forces likely to deploy globally or just to certain regions? At what depths from the littoral might U.S. forces have to operate? To assess deployment and basing options, the study team developed a simple spreadsheet that calculated transit times, loading and unloading times, and airfield throughput. It used military planning factors to determine aircraft usage rates, and maximum loads and ranges, and it drew on a variety of historical materials and interviews for the broader analysis of strategic responsiveness. This report concludes that the Stryker Brigade cannot deploy by air or sea from bases in the United States to key regions in 4 days. Deployment times range from 9 days (Colombia) to 21 days (Afghanistan). Even if unlimited numbers of aircraft were available, airlift would still be constrained by the condition of receiving airfields in most scenarios. In some scenarios, the brigade would close as rapidly with sealift but still fall well short of the 4-day goal. However, using combinations of airlift and fast sealift to move forces from forward bases or preposition sites, forces could reach key regions in 5 to 9 days and most of the globe could be covered in two weeks--a great improvement over historic deployment times for motorized forces.
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Electronic Resources
Relevance:
2.2020
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by
Spencer, Otha Cleo, 1920-
Call Number
940.544373 20
Publication Date
1994 1992
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
1.9044
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