by
Bensahel, Nora, 1971-
Call Number
956.70443 22
Publication Date
2008
Summary
This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts or postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuilding structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.
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1.2797
by
Gregg, Heather S.
Call Number
956.70443 22
Publication Date
2010
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1.1741
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by
Libicki, Martin C.
Call Number
322.42 22
Publication Date
2007
Summary
U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed to exploit information power, which could be a U.S. advantage but instead is being used advantageously by insurgents. Because insurgency and counterinsurgency involve a battle for the allegiance of a population between a government and an armed opposition movement, the key to exploiting information power is to connect with and learn from the population itself, increasing the effectiveness of both the local government and the U.S. military and civilian services engaged in supporting it. Utilizing mostly available networking technology, the United States could achieve early, affordable, and substantial gains in the effectiveness of counterinsurgency by more open, integrated, and inclusive information networking with the population, local authorities, and coalition partners. The most basic information link with the population would be an information technology (IT)-enhanced, fraud-resistant registry-census. The most promising link would come from utilizing local cell phone networks, which are proliferating even among poor countries. Access to data routinely collected by such networks can form the basis for security services such as enhanced-911 and forensics. The cell phones of a well-wired citizenry can be tantamount to sensor fields in settled areas. They can link indigenous forces with each other and with U.S. forces without interoperability problems; they can also track the responses of such forces to emergencies. Going further, outfitting weaponry with video cameras would bolster surveillance, provide lessons learned, and guard against operator misconduct. Establishing a national Wiki can help citizens describe their neighborhoods to familiarize U.S. forces with them and can promote accountable service delivery. All such information can improve counterinsurgency operations by making U.S. forces and agencies far better informed than they are at present. The authors argue that today's military and intelligence networks -- being closed, compartmentalized, controlled by information providers instead of users, and limited to U.S. war fighters -- hamper counterinsurgency and deprive the United States of what ought to be a strategic advantage. In contrast, based on a review of 160 requirements for counterinsurgency, the authors call for current networks to be replaced by an integrated counterinsurgency operating network (ICON) linking U.S. and indigenous operators, based on principles of inclusiveness, integration, and user preeminence. Utilizing the proposed ways of gathering information from the population, ICON would improve the timeliness, reliability, and relevance of information, while focusing security restrictions on truly sensitive information. The complexity and sensitivity of counterinsurgency call for vastly better use of IT than has been seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here is a practical plan for just that.
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0.2470
by
Perry, Walt L.
Call Number
355.34320973 22
Publication Date
2008
Summary
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. It is likely that U.S. forces will face similar, irregular warfare tactics from future enemies that are unwilling to engage in conventional combat with U.S. forces. This monograph examines the nature of the contemporary insurgent threat and provides insights on using operational analysis techniques to support intelligence operations in counterinsurgencies. The authors examine the stages of an insurgency and discuss the kinds of intelligence that are needed at each stage. A number of techniques--pattern discernment and predictive analysis, for example--appear to show promise of being useful to intelligence analysis. The authors also explore two closely connected methods in depth to examine the interactions between friendly and enemy forces: game theory and change detection.
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Electronic Resources
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0.1313
by
Serena, Chad C.
Call Number
956.7044340973 22
Publication Date
2011
Summary
During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control. To achieve success, the US A.
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0.1270
by
Stearns Lawson, Brooke.
Call Number
355.02180723 R245 22
Publication Date
2010
Summary
"Successful counterinsurgency (COIN) requires the integration of security and civil COIN to create conditions that allow the population to choose between the government and insurgents, eliminate the grievances that gave rise to the insurgency, and present the population with choices that are more attractive than what the insurgents can offer. Building on a framework for integrating civil and military counterinsurgency first described in Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency, this volume presents an approach to the civil component of counterinsurgency that builds on detailed background, context analysis, and threat analysis to identify and develop critical civil COIN activities. It illustrates this approach using three case studies: Nangarhar province in Afghanistan, Nord-Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Al Anbar province in Iraq. The approach builds on the best aspects of existing conflict assessment methodologies and adds new elements developed specifically for this project. The resulting framework goes beyond the strategic and operational decisions related to designing a program that is appropriate for a given conflict context."--Page 4 of cover.
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0.1132
by
Stephenson, James, 1946-
Call Number
956.704431 22
Publication Date
2007
Summary
"In emergency medicine, "the golden hour" is the first hour after injury during which treatment greatly increases survivability. In post-conflict transition terminology, it is the first year after hostilities end. Without steadily improving conditions then, popular support declines and chances for economic, political, and social transformation begin to evaporate." "James Stephenson believes we have lost Iraq's golden hour. A veteran of post-conflict reconstruction on three continents, he ran the Iraq mission of the Agency for International Development in 2004-2005 with more than a thousand employees and expatriate contractors. The Coalition Provisional Authority, which oversaw the largest reconstruction and nation-building exercise ever, was a dysfunctional organization the Department of Defense cobbled together with temporary employees and a few experienced professionals from the State Department and other agencies. Iraqis soon became disillusioned, and the Insurgency grew." "Losing the Golden Hour tells of hubris, incompetence, courage, fear, and duty. It is about foreign assistance professionals trying to overcome the mistakes of an ill-conceived occupation and help Iraqis create a nation after decades of despair. Neither criticizing nor defending U.S. foreign policy, Stephenson offers an informed assessment of Iraq's future."--Jacket.
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0.1078
by
Mosher, David E.
Call Number
355.41 22
Publication Date
2008
Summary
Recent experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans have highlighted the importance of environmental considerations. These range from protecting soldier health and disposing of hazardous waste to building water supply systems and other activities that help achieve national goals in the post-conflict phase of contingency operations. The Army has become increasingly involved with environmental issues in every contingency operation and must be better prepared to deal with them. This study assesses whether existing policy, doctrine, and guidance adequately address environmental activities in post-conflict military operations and reconstruction. Findings are based on reviews of top-level policy and doctrine, analysis of operational experience, extensive interviews with diverse Army personnel, and a review of operational documentation and literature. From these sources, a database of 111 case studies was created. The research showed that environmental concerns can have far-reaching and significant impacts on the Army, both direct and indirect, especially in terms of cost, current operations, soldier health, diplomatic relations, reconstruction activities, and the ultimate success of the operation or the broader mission. Some evidence suggests that environmental problems may have even contributed to insurgency in Iraq. Recommendations include updating current policy and doctrine to fully address environmental considerations in contingency operations; ensuring that contractors are carefully selected and managed; and transmitting proactive field environmental practices and lessons throughout the Army.
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0.1031
by
Caldwell, John Dean, 1940- author.
Call Number
355.009730904 23
Publication Date
2019
Summary
"This groundbreaking book provides the first systematic comparison of America's modern wars, analyzing how and why the United States has moved from success to failure since WWII. As the United States enters a new period of uncertainty in the world, Caldwell makes the compelling case that leaders must think, plan, and prepare before shooting"--
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0.0921
by
Polsky, Andrew Joseph.
Call Number
352.235 23
Publication Date
2012
Summary
On April 4, 1864, Abraham Lincoln made a shocking admission about his presidency during the Civil War. "I claim not to have controlled events," he wrote in a letter, "but confess plainly that events have controlled me." Lincoln's words carry an invaluable lesson for wartime presidents, writes Andrew J. Polsky in this seminal book. As Polsky shows, when commanders-in-chief do try to control wartime events, more often than not they fail utterly. In Elusive Victories, Polsky provides a fascinating study of six wartime presidents, drawing larger lessons about the limits of the power of the White House during armed conflict. He examines, in turn, Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, showing how each gravely overestimated his power as commander-in-chief. In each case, these presidents' resources did not match the key challenges that recur from war to war. Both Lincoln and Johnson intervened in military operations, giving orders to specific units; yet both struggled with the rising unpopularity of their conflicts. Both Wilson and Bush entered hostilities with idealistic agendas for the aftermath, yet found themselves helpless to enact them. With insight and clarity, Polsky identifies overarching issues that will inform current and future policymakers. The single most important dynamic, he writes, is the erosion of a president's freedom of action. Each decision propels him down a path from which he cannot turn back. When George W. Bush rejected the idea of invading Iraq with 400,000 troops, he could not send such a force two years later as the insurgency spread. In the final chapter, Polsky examines Barack Obama's options in light of these conclusions, and considers how the experiences of the past might inform the world we face now. Elusive Victories is the first book to provide a comprehensive account of presidential leadership during wartime, highlighting the key dangers that presidents have ignored at their peril.
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0.0921
11.
by
Pirnie, Bruce, 1940-
Call Number
956.704434 22
Publication Date
2008
Summary
Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Overview of the conflict in Iraq -- Ba'athist regime -- Invasion of Iraq -- Occupation of Iraq -- First priority : setting up a constitutional government -- Spring -- The spiral downward begins (Spring 2004) -- Benchmark one : holding Iraqi elections -- Islamic extremists and sectarian violence -- A U.S. approach hesitantly unfold -- Armed groups in Iraq -- Overview -- Kurdish separatists -- Sunni Arab insurgents -- Violent extremists -- Shi'ite Arab militias -- Criminal gangs -- Insurgent use of terrorism -- Counterinsurgency in Iraq -- Organization and recognition of the U.S. COIN effort is slow to unfold -- Traditional U.S. military forces may need to be adjusted -- Fallujah -- Tal Afar -- Baghdad -- Air support -- Combatting improvised explosive devices -- Detainee operations -- U.S. development and support of Iraqi forces -- Iraqi police -- Iraqi armed forces -- Assessing progress in counterinsurgency -- Iraqi casualties and displacement -- Iraqi economy -- Iraqi opinion -- Accounting for success and failure -- Understanding Iraqi society -- Little planning for the occupation of Iraq -- The impact of a lack od international support for the war -- The disastrous effects of prematurely dismantling the Ba'athist regime -- The challenge of building a new Iraqi state from scratch -- Instituting a new system of justice -- Undertaking the reconstruction of Iraq -- The consequences of failing to maintain security early on military missions -- Lck of infiltration and tips hinder intelligence on the insurgency -- Building effective capabilities for counterinsurgency -- Use of force -- Public safety and security -- Partnering with and enabling indigenous forces -- Reporting on the enemy and infiltration -- Provision of essential services -- Informing and influencing operations -- Rigorous and coordinated detainee operations -- Recommendations -- Development of strategy -- Coalition-building -- Planning process -- Unity of effort -- Interagency process -- Host-nation governance -- Funding mechanisms -- Counterinsurgency as a mission -- Protection of the indigenous population -- Personnel policy -- U.S. Army special forces -- Partnership with indigenous forces -- Policing functions -- Brigade organization -- Gunship-like capability -- Intelligence collection and sharing.
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0.0776
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