by
Loomis, David, 1955-
Call Number
355.709793 20
Publication Date
1993
Format:
Electronic Resources
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120272.2969
by
Loomis, David, 1955-
Call Number
355.709793 20
Publication Date
1993
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
120272.2969
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by
Kavanagh, Jennifer, 1981-
Call Number
355.033573 23
Publication Date
2013
Summary
Current DoD force planning processes assume that U.S. military interventions are serially independent over time. This report challenges this assumption, arguing that interventions occur in temporally dependent clusters in which the likelihood of an intervention depends on interventions in the recent past. The author used data on 66 U.S. Army contingency and peacekeeping deployments of at least company size between 1949 and 2010 and found evidence of temporal dependence between military interventions even when controlling for political, economic, and other security factors. However, the results also suggested that clustering is affected by the nature of the geopolitical regime and is stronger at certain points than others, for example, after the Cold War as compared to during the Cold War. The results suggested that as few as two military interventions above average is often enough to trigger interventions in subsequent years. Because current planning processes address only the direct force demands of a given deployment and ignore the heightened risk for additional demands created by temporal dependence, these processes may project force requirements that understate the demands placed on military deployments during a period of clustered interventions. This analysis suggests that DoD should consider modifying the integrated security constructs to incorporate serial correlation of interventions, making assumptions about the nature of the current or future geopolitical regime explicit, and assessing whether the existing set of force planning frameworks reflects the spectrum of potential future geopolitical regimes.
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89652.0000
by
Peters, John E., 1947- author.
Call Number
355.033573 23
Publication Date
2016
Summary
The U.S. military spends more than 14 countries combined and possesses state-of-the art weapons and equipment, yet after 13 years of effort, 1.4 trillion, and some 6,000 casualties, it still has been unable to defeat its enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The book explains why and how it can be remedied.
Format:
Electronic Resources
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85047.4141
by
Johnson, David E. (David Eugene), 1950-
Call Number
355.684 22
Publication Date
2009
Summary
"The difficult and continually evolving operations in Iraq and Afghanistan show the complexities of what is now termed irregular warfare and highlight the need for new approaches to the security challenges with which the United States is now contending and will likely confront in the future. The research reported in this monograph focused on answering a rather straightforward, but thus far largely unanswered, question: What can the U.S. military learn from other militaries about how better to prepare for full-spectrum operations and deployments? To this end, RAND was asked by the OSD for Personnel and Readiness to examine the militaries of China, France, the UK, India, and Israel."--Page xiii.
Format:
Electronic Resources
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3.0575
by
Davis, Lynn E. (Lynn Etheridge), 1943-
Call Number
363.348 22
Publication Date
2007
Summary
The efforts undertaken by civilian and military organizations in response to Hurricane Katrina were historically unprecedented, but problems did arise in the military response that contributed to delays in accomplishing evacuations and relief operations across the storm-ravaged areas of Louisiana and Mississippi, particularly New Orleans. A number of steps can be taken to enhance future military disaster-response efforts: give the National Guard the federal mission to conduct homeland security activities; make each National Guard unit capable of rapid deployment; prepare governors to call up G.
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Electronic Resources
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2.2751
by
Davis, Paul K., 1943-
Call Number
355.6840973 22
Publication Date
2008
Summary
An analytical framework and methodology for capability-area reviews is described, along with new tools to support capabilities analysis and strategic-level defense planning in the Defense Department and the Services. BCOT generates and screens preliminary options, and the Portfolio-Analysis Tool (PAT) is used to evaluate options that pass screening. The concepts are illustrated with applications to Global Strike and Ballistic Missile Defense. Recommendations are made for further defense-planning research.
Format:
Electronic Resources
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2.2722
by
Ochmanek, David A.
Call Number
355.40973 21
Publication Date
1998
Summary
Absent significant changes in U.S. defense investment priorities, American forces could soon find themselves unable to cope with some emerging challenges in large-scale power projection operations. Specifically, U.S. forces will need better capabilities to secure a foothold in distant theaters, to defeat weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, to gain control of operations in the air, and to locate and destroy invading ground forces. New surveillance sensors, information processing capabilities, communication systems, and guided munitions are enabling operational concepts that can allow U.S. forces to meet emerging challenges and, indeed, to adopt new approaches to warfare. The authors assess quantitatively the capabilities of U.S. forces in the context of a generic scenario depicting a large-scale war in the next decade. From this, they identify priorities for modernizing U.S. forces. They argue that modernization dollars should be focused on forces and enabling capabilities that allow for decisive operations early in a conflict. If necessary, funds for such enhancements can come from modest reductions in forces that are slower to deploy.
Format:
Electronic Resources
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2.2311
by
Kugler, Richard L.
Call Number
358.41357 21
Publication Date
1998
Summary
U.S. military forces stationed abroad play vital roles. As regional political and military dynamics shift, so too will the United States need to adjust its overseas military posture to accommodate new objectives and missions in new places. In general, that posture will need to become more flexible and more expeditionary, covering a wider array of challenges and broader geographic areas. Such changes can be unsettling to accomplish and may even worry allies and friends. Yet the United States cannot adequately reassure foreign countries with an outdated force posture. Planning for these changes should not be based on marginal adjustments to arbitrary manpower levels but should assess strategic objectives, missions, and requirements before considering the implications for manpower, units, activities, and money. This planning also should establish coherent goals and orderly means of reaching them, rather than muddle along in incremental ways that lack direction or can be blown off course by the shifting political winds. This study offers eight options that can be used to help guide thinking and planning for the coming era of change.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
2.2198
by
Birkler, J. L., 1944-
Call Number
355.033273 21
Publication Date
1998
Summary
The process of modernizing U.S. military forces is the focus of this report. This process requires reinvigorating concept development efforts, thinking broadly about alternatives, and pursuing concept development before decisions are made about which services, which platforms, or which technologies are best suited for accomplishing current or new military tasks. In February and March 1996, RAND convened a concept options group (COG), which included broadly knowledgeable technologists drawn from a variety of scientific and engineering backgrounds, experienced military operators, and senior analysts and planners. By focusing on two specific military tasks, the COG considered options for using technologies that could enable U.S. forces to perform an existing military mission better, perform it differently, or gain a new capability. This report presents highlights from the COG discussions as well as some suggestions for convening future COGs.
Format:
Electronic Resources
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2.2101
by
Kent, Glenn A., 1915-
Call Number
355.033073 22
Publication Date
2008
Summary
"Lieutenant General Glenn A. Kent was a uniquely acute analyst and developer of American defense policy in the second half of the twentieth century. His 33-year career in the Air Force was followed by more than 20 years as one of the leading analysts at RAND. This volume is not a memoir in the normal sense but rather a summary of the dozens of national security issues in which Glenn was personally engaged over the course of his career. These issues included creating the single integrated operational plan (SIOP), leading DoD's official assessment of strategic defenses in the 1960s, developing and analyzing strategic nuclear arms control agreements, helping to bring new weapon systems to life, and many others. Each vignette describes the analytical frameworks and, where appropriate, the mathematical formulas and charts that Glenn developed and applied to gain insights into the issue at hand. The author also relates his roles in much of the bureaucratic pulling and hauling that occurred as issues were addressed within the government."--Publisher's website.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
2.2097
by
Allen, Patrick D.
Call Number
355.343 22
Publication Date
2007
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
2.0473
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