by
Feldman, Noah, 1970-
Call Number
956.704431 22
Publication Date
2004
Summary
What do we owe Iraq? America is up to its neck in nation building--but the public debate, focused on getting the troops home, devotes little attention to why we are building a new Iraqi nation, what success would look like, or what principles should guide us. What We Owe Iraq sets out to shift the terms of the debate, acknowledging that we are nation building to protect ourselves while demanding that we put the interests of the people being governed--whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, or elsewhere--ahead of our own when we exercise power over them. Noah Feldman argues that to prevent nation.
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3.8974
by
Dobbins, James, 1942-
Call Number
956.704431 22
Publication Date
2009
Summary
"The American engagement in Iraq has been looked at from many perspectives: the flawed intelligence that provided the war's rationale, the failed effort to secure an international mandate, the rapid success of the invasion, and the long ensuing counterinsurgency campaign. This book focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its administrator, L. Paul Bremer, who governed Iraq from May 2003 to June of the following year. It is based on interviews with many of those responsible for setting and implementing occupation policy, on the memoirs of American and Iraqi officials who have since left office, on journalists' accounts of the period, and on nearly 100,000 never-before-released CPA documents. The book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, reform the judicial and penal systems, fight corruption, revitalize the economy, and create the basis for representative government. It also addresses the occupation's most striking failure: the inability of the United States and its coalition partners to protect the Iraqi people from the criminals and extremists in their midst."--Page 4 of cover.
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3.8344
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by
Stephenson, James, 1946-
Call Number
956.704431 22
Publication Date
2007
Summary
"In emergency medicine, "the golden hour" is the first hour after injury during which treatment greatly increases survivability. In post-conflict transition terminology, it is the first year after hostilities end. Without steadily improving conditions then, popular support declines and chances for economic, political, and social transformation begin to evaporate." "James Stephenson believes we have lost Iraq's golden hour. A veteran of post-conflict reconstruction on three continents, he ran the Iraq mission of the Agency for International Development in 2004-2005 with more than a thousand employees and expatriate contractors. The Coalition Provisional Authority, which oversaw the largest reconstruction and nation-building exercise ever, was a dysfunctional organization the Department of Defense cobbled together with temporary employees and a few experienced professionals from the State Department and other agencies. Iraqis soon became disillusioned, and the Insurgency grew." "Losing the Golden Hour tells of hubris, incompetence, courage, fear, and duty. It is about foreign assistance professionals trying to overcome the mistakes of an ill-conceived occupation and help Iraqis create a nation after decades of despair. Neither criticizing nor defending U.S. foreign policy, Stephenson offers an informed assessment of Iraq's future."--Jacket.
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3.8026
by
Pirnie, Bruce, 1940-
Call Number
956.704434 22
Publication Date
2008
Summary
Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Overview of the conflict in Iraq -- Ba'athist regime -- Invasion of Iraq -- Occupation of Iraq -- First priority : setting up a constitutional government -- Spring -- The spiral downward begins (Spring 2004) -- Benchmark one : holding Iraqi elections -- Islamic extremists and sectarian violence -- A U.S. approach hesitantly unfold -- Armed groups in Iraq -- Overview -- Kurdish separatists -- Sunni Arab insurgents -- Violent extremists -- Shi'ite Arab militias -- Criminal gangs -- Insurgent use of terrorism -- Counterinsurgency in Iraq -- Organization and recognition of the U.S. COIN effort is slow to unfold -- Traditional U.S. military forces may need to be adjusted -- Fallujah -- Tal Afar -- Baghdad -- Air support -- Combatting improvised explosive devices -- Detainee operations -- U.S. development and support of Iraqi forces -- Iraqi police -- Iraqi armed forces -- Assessing progress in counterinsurgency -- Iraqi casualties and displacement -- Iraqi economy -- Iraqi opinion -- Accounting for success and failure -- Understanding Iraqi society -- Little planning for the occupation of Iraq -- The impact of a lack od international support for the war -- The disastrous effects of prematurely dismantling the Ba'athist regime -- The challenge of building a new Iraqi state from scratch -- Instituting a new system of justice -- Undertaking the reconstruction of Iraq -- The consequences of failing to maintain security early on military missions -- Lck of infiltration and tips hinder intelligence on the insurgency -- Building effective capabilities for counterinsurgency -- Use of force -- Public safety and security -- Partnering with and enabling indigenous forces -- Reporting on the enemy and infiltration -- Provision of essential services -- Informing and influencing operations -- Rigorous and coordinated detainee operations -- Recommendations -- Development of strategy -- Coalition-building -- Planning process -- Unity of effort -- Interagency process -- Host-nation governance -- Funding mechanisms -- Counterinsurgency as a mission -- Protection of the indigenous population -- Personnel policy -- U.S. Army special forces -- Partnership with indigenous forces -- Policing functions -- Brigade organization -- Gunship-like capability -- Intelligence collection and sharing.
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3.8017
by
Cotton, Sarah K.
Call Number
956.704431 22
Publication Date
2010
Summary
"The use of armed private security contractors (PSCs) in the Iraq war has been unprecedented. Not only government agencies but also journalists, reconstruction contractors, and nongovernmental organizations frequently view them as a logical choice to fill their security needs, yet there have been a number of reports of PSCs committing serious, and sometimes fatal, abuses of power in Iraq. This study uses a systematic, empirically based survey of opinions of U.S. military and State Department personnel on the ground in Iraq to shed light on the following questions: To what extent are armed PSCs perceived to be imposing costs on the U.S. military effort? If so, are those costs tempered by positive contributions? How has the use of PSCs affected U.S. military operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom? While the military personnel did report some incidents of unnecessarily threatening, arrogant, or belligerent contractor behavior, the survey results indicate that neither the U.S. military nor State Department personnel appear to perceive PSCs to be "running wild" in Iraq. Moreover, respondents tended to consider PSCs a force multiplier rather than an additional strain on military troops, but both military and State Department respondents held mixed views regarding the contribution of armed contractors to U.S. foreign policy objectives."--Page 4 of cover.
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3.3581
by
Brennan, Richard, 1954-
Call Number
956.7044310973 23
Publication Date
2013
Summary
Over the course of the U.S. engagement in Iraq, the U.S. military managed hundreds of bases and facilities and used millions of pieces of equipment. The military was not only involved with security-related activities but also assisted in political and economic functions the host nation government or other U.S. departments would normally perform. A 2010 assessment identified that responsibility for 431 activities would need to be handed off to the government of Iraq, the U.S. embassy, U.S. Central Command, or other U.S. government departments. Ending the U.S. war in Iraq would also require redeploying over 100,000 military and civilian personnel and moving or transferring ownership of over a million pieces of property, including facilities, in accordance with U.S. and Iraqi laws, national policy, and DoD requirements. This book looks at the planning and execution of this transition, using information gathered from historical documents and interviews with key players. It examines efforts to help Iraq build the capacity necessary to manage its own security absent a U.S. military presence. It also looks at the complications that arose from uncertainty over just how much of a presence the United States would continue to have beyond 2011 and how various posttransition objectives would be advanced. The authors also examine efforts to create an embassy intended to survive in a hostile environment by being entirely self-sufficient, performing missions the military previously performed. The authors draw lessons from these events that can help plan for ending future wars.--
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2.0992
by
Lamani, Mokhtar.
Call Number
956.70443
Publication Date
2010
Summary
Iraq's streets are unsafe, its people tormented, and its identity as a state challenged from within and without. For some, Iraq is synonymous with internal hatred, bloodshed, and sectarianism. The contributors to this book, however, know another Iraq: a country that was once full of hope and achievement and that boasted one of the most educated workforces in its region-a cosmopolitan secular society with a great tradition of artisans, poets, and intellectuals. The memory of that Iraq inspired the editors of this volume to explore Iraq's current struggle. The contributors delve into the issues.
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1.9739
by
Bensahel, Nora, 1971-
Call Number
956.70443 22
Publication Date
2008
Summary
This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts or postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuilding structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.
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1.9195
by
Gregg, Heather S.
Call Number
956.70443 22
Publication Date
2010
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1.7612
by
Whiteley, Jason, 1977-
Call Number
956.704431 22
Publication Date
2011
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1.6614
by
Perry, Walt L.
Call Number
956.704431 22
Publication Date
2009
Summary
Security has improved dramatically in Iraq since 2007; both the U.S. and the Iraqi governments want to see the U.S. presence reduced and have the Iraqis assume a greater role in providing for public security. These developments have brought the United States to a critical juncture in Iraq. The emerging challenge is to continue a withdrawal of U.S. forces while preserving security and stability in the country and in the region. With this in mind, the U.S. Congress provided resources in the fiscal year 2009 Defense Appropriations Act for an independent study to assess alternative schedules to draw down U.S. forces and effect the transition to Iraqi forces providing for the nation's security. This study assesses the feasibility of three such plans and makes recommendations designed to reduce the risks attendant on withdrawal; these recommendations are, for the most part, relevant whichever drawdown schedule is ultimately met.
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1.4195
by
Gallagher, Brendan R., 1978- author.
Call Number
327.1 23
Publication Date
2019
Summary
"Since 9/11, why have we won smashing battlefield victories only to botch nearly everything that comes next? In the opening phases of war in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, we mopped the floor with our enemies. But in short order, things went horribly wrong.We soon discovered we had no coherent plan to manage the'day after.'The ensuing debacles had truly staggering consequences--many thousands of lives lost, trillions of dollars squandered, and the apparent discrediting of our foreign policy establishment. This helped set the stage for an extraordinary historical moment in which America's role in the world, along with our commitment to democracy at home and abroad, have become subject to growing doubt. With the benefit of hindsight, can we discern what went wrong? Why have we had such great difficulty planning for the aftermath of war?In The Day After, Brendan Gallagher--an Army lieutenant colonel with multiple combat tours to Iraq and Afghanistan, and a Princeton Ph.D.--seeks to tackle this vital question. Gallagher argues there is a tension between our desire to create a new democracy and our competing desire to pull out as soon as possible. Our leaders often strive to accomplish both to keep everyone happy. But by avoiding the tough underlying decisions, it fosters an incoherent strategy. This makes chaos more likely.The Day After draws on new interviews with dozens of civilian and military officials, ranging from US cabinet secretaries to four-star generals. It also sheds light on how, in Kosovo, we lowered our postwar aims to quietly achieve a surprising partial success. Striking at the heart of what went wrong in our recent wars, and what we should do about it, Gallagher asks whether we will learn from our mistakes, or provoke even more disasters? Human lives, money, elections, and America's place in the world may hinge on the answer"--Publisher's description.
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