by
Kalinovsky, Artemy M.
Call Number
958.1045 22
Publication Date
2011
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3.2210
by
Roberts, Geoffrey, 1952-
Call Number
909.825 21
Publication Date
1999
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Electronic Resources
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0.4507
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by
Wilson, James Graham, 1980- author.
Call Number
327.73047 23
Publication Date
2014
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Electronic Resources
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0.4445
by
Lynch, Edward A.
Call Number
973.927 22
Publication Date
2011
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Electronic Resources
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0.4174
by
Haslam, Jonathan.
Call Number
327.4700904 22
Publication Date
2011
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Electronic Resources
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0.4066
by
Dietrich, John, 1946-
Call Number
940.53144094 21
Publication Date
2002
Summary
After hostilities officially ceased, what drove American policy towards Germany in 1944-1949? While Soviet policies came under closer inspection, Western policies have rarely been subjected to critical review. This book deals with the Morgenthau Plan and its impact on American postwar planning. Conventional accounts of Western postwar policies occasionally mention the Morgenthau Plan, describing it as a plan developed in the Treasury Department designed to deindustrialize or "pastoralize" the German nation. These accounts are chiefly characterized by their brevity, at most admitting that "[it] and its temporary and partial adoption ... was an unfortunate but small chapter in American diplomatic history." Conventional accounts state that the Plan was adopted by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944, and that, when President Roosevelt was informed of its impracticality, he immediately abandoned it and stated that he had initialed the plan "without much thought." Contrary to what is often reported in history books, the Morgenthau Plan had a major impact on post war planning. This book traces the role of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury, in the planning for the post war world, with close attention to the discussions leading up to the Second Quebec Conference where Winston Churchill's acceptance of the plan was obtained. It follows the devastating consequences of the policies based on the plan, and their contribution to the post war collapse of the European economy. Damning evidence shows that the Allies intentionally brought starvation and disease to large civilian populations. "This is a startling, important book which I hope will rattle the bones of the comfortable court historians of the USA, such as Stephen Ambrose, who have spent their careers shading and evading the truth that the world and their students deserve, and do not get."--James Bacque, Author of Other Losses and Crimes and Mercies (published by Little, Brown and Co.). John Dietrich holds a Masters Degree in International Relations and is an expert on post war conditions in Europe. Upon retiring from the US Army, he served in the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1985 until 1991.
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0.3913
by
Marlo, Francis H.
Call Number
973.927 23
Publication Date
2012
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Electronic Resources
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0.3683
by
Dunn, Dennis J.
Call Number
327.47073 21
Publication Date
1998
Summary
On November 16, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov signed an agreement establishing diplomatic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two days later Roosevelt named the first of five ambassadors he would place in Moscow between 1933 and 1945. Caught between Roosevelt and Stalin tells the dramatic and important story of these ambassadors and their often contentious relationships with the two most powerful men in the world. More than fifty years after his death, Roosevelt's foreign policy, especially regarding the Soviet Union, remains a subject of intense debate. Dennis Dunn offers an ambitious new appraisal of the apparent confusion and contradiction in Roosevelt's policy - one moment publicizing the four freedoms and the Atlantic Charter and the next moment giving tacit approval to Stalin's control of parts of Eastern Europe and northeast Asia. Dunn argues that "Rooseveltism," the president's belief that the Soviet Union and the United States were both developing into modern social democracies, blinded Roosevelt to the true nature of Stalin's brutal dictatorship despite repeated warnings from his ambassadors in Moscow.
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Electronic Resources
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0.3432
by
Burridge, John T.
Call Number
943.155087 22
Publication Date
2011
Summary
For the first time in modern history, a regime had to wall itself in to keep from bleeding to death. The masses of refugees that had staked their hopes on the Berlin escape route through the Iron Curtain were cut off from freedom by this wall of death erected by a Soviet puppet and tolerated by the new American president and his administration. The United States had witnessed and permitted, even conspired in, the undoing of those human rights to which it was purportedly committed. Contrary to ...
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0.3064
by
Davis, Donald E.
Call Number
327.7304709041 22
Publication Date
2002
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
0.2953
11.
by
Logvinenko, Igor O. (Igor Olegovich), 1983- author.
Call Number
330.947 23
Publication Date
2021
Summary
"Financial internationalization of Russia's economy since 1991, which was deeply entangled with competition for control over the vestiges of the Soviet industrial empire in an environment of insecure property rights, allowed domestic elites to legitimize their new wealth without improving domestic rule of law institutions"--
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Electronic Resources
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0.2819
by
Naimark, Norman M. author
Call Number
940.554 23
Publication Date
2019
Summary
The Cold War division of Europe was not inevitable--the acclaimed author of Stalin's Genocides shows how postwar Europeans fought to determine their own destinies. Was the division of Europe after World War II inevitable? In this powerful reassessment of the postwar order in Europe, Norman Naimark suggests that Joseph Stalin was far more open to a settlement on the continent than we have thought. Through revealing case studies from Poland and Yugoslavia to Denmark and Albania, Naimark recasts the early Cold War by focusing on Europeans' fight to determine their future. As nations devastated by war began rebuilding, Soviet intentions loomed large. Stalin's armies controlled most of the eastern half of the continent, and in France and Italy, communist parties were serious political forces. Yet Naimark reveals a surprisingly flexible Stalin, who initially had no intention of dividing Europe. During a window of opportunity from 1945 to 1948, leaders across the political spectrum, including Juho Kusti Paasikivi of Finland, Wladyslaw Gomulka of Poland, and Karl Renner of Austria, pushed back against outside pressures. For some, this meant struggling against Soviet dominance. For others, it meant enlisting the Americans to support their aims. The first frost of Cold War could be felt in the tense patrolling of zones of occupation in Germany, but not until 1948, with the coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, did the familiar polarization set in. The split did not become irreversible until the formal division of Germany and establishment of NATO in 1949. In illuminating how European leaders deftly managed national interests in the face of dominating powers, Stalin and the Fate of Europe reveals the real potential of an alternative trajectory for the continent.--
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Electronic Resources
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0.2819
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