by
Lostumbo, Michael, author.
Call Number
355.70681 23
Publication Date
2013
Summary
Section 347 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act called on the Department of Defense to commission an independent assessment of the overseas basing presence of U.S. military forces. As the recipient of that commission, RAND's National Defense Research Institute conducted an independent assessment of the advisability of changes in the overseas basing presence of U.S. forces based on an evaluation of strategic benefits, risks, and costs. The report characterizes how overseas presence contributes to assurance of allies, deterrence, contingency responsiveness, and security cooperation, along with the risks involved with investing in facilities overseas. It breaks new ground in the understanding of the costs associated with overseas presence, including how permanent and rotational presence costs compare, and provides cost models for policymakers to weigh alternative posture options. To support this understanding of costs the report also lays out the conditions of U.S. installations and levels of host nation support. The report concludes that there are certain minimum requirements necessary to carry out the current national security strategy, but it is prudent, based upon the net value produced, to maintain an overseas posture that goes beyond these minimums. Additionally, it combines benefit, cost, and risk considerations to distill a number of strategic judgments that have implications for the advisability of considering identified posture changes.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
3.8878
by
Hosek, James R.
Call Number
355.223620973 22
Publication Date
2009
Summary
The military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been the United States' longest military engagements since the Vietnam War and the most severe test of the all-volunteer force, with the possible exception of the Gulf War in 1991. More than 1.5 million service members were deployed between 2002 and 2007, many of them more than once, and the fast pace of deployment has been felt throughout the military. Soldiers and marines have faced a steady cycle of predeployment training and exercises, deployment itself, and postdeployment reassignment and unit regeneration. Service members not on deployment are nonetheless busy planning and supporting military operations, caring for injured service members, and attending to recruiting, training, and other responsibilities at home and abroad. Many service members are married, and deployments have disrupted their family routines and created stress from separation and reintegration. At the same time, the long hours, tension, uncertainty, and violence of deployments have stressed the service members sent to fight. Remarkably, despite the pressures from deployments on service members and their families, reenlistment rates have been stable since 2002. The purpose of this monograph is to enhance understanding of whether deployments affected service members' willingness to stay in the military, as the stress caused by deployments would suggest, and how it was that reenlistment held steady.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
3.4160
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by
Vick, Alan.
Call Number
355.130973 21
Publication Date
2002
Summary
To better understand the requirement for strategic responsiveness, as well as what is achievable, this study sought to answer the following questions: Can the Air Force meet the Army's 4-day deployment goal? What combination of deployment and basing options would maximize the strategic responsiveness of new Army forces? How much unambiguous warning does the United States usually have before it initiates military operations? How much of this time will civilian decisionmakers typically consume in their deliberations before ordering deployment of military forces? Are large U.S. forces likely to deploy globally or just to certain regions? At what depths from the littoral might U.S. forces have to operate? To assess deployment and basing options, the study team developed a simple spreadsheet that calculated transit times, loading and unloading times, and airfield throughput. It used military planning factors to determine aircraft usage rates, and maximum loads and ranges, and it drew on a variety of historical materials and interviews for the broader analysis of strategic responsiveness. This report concludes that the Stryker Brigade cannot deploy by air or sea from bases in the United States to key regions in 4 days. Deployment times range from 9 days (Colombia) to 21 days (Afghanistan). Even if unlimited numbers of aircraft were available, airlift would still be constrained by the condition of receiving airfields in most scenarios. In some scenarios, the brigade would close as rapidly with sealift but still fall well short of the 4-day goal. However, using combinations of airlift and fast sealift to move forces from forward bases or preposition sites, forces could reach key regions in 5 to 9 days and most of the globe could be covered in two weeks--a great improvement over historic deployment times for motorized forces.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
3.3030
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