Call Number
359.00973 22
Publication Date
2009
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
201528.8594
by
Still, William N.
Call Number
940.45973 22
Publication Date
2006
Summary
The first comprehensive history of the United States Navy in European waters during World War I.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
105949.1328
View Other Search Results
by
United States. Navy Dept.
Call Number
ARC STA 641.573 APP
Publication Date
1955
Format:
Books
Relevance:
23033.6563
by
Yardley, Roland J.
Call Number
359.94835 22
Publication Date
2008
Summary
The U.S. Navy's aircraft carriers allow the nation to deter adversaries, bring airpower to bear against opponents, engage friends and allies, and provide humanitarian assistance. However, these powerful and versatile systems need continuous and regularly scheduled maintenance, and their crews require a great deal of training to attain and sustain readiness levels. The length of the carrier's training, readiness, deployment, and maintenance cycle, the type of maintenance needed, and the timing of events within the cycle affect the carrier's availability to meet operational needs. Over the past two decades, the proportion of time in a cycle that a carrier spends deployed has decreased, making it difficult for Navy planners to meet the forward-presence requirements of theater commanders. In future years, as the number of carriers in the fleet fluctuates, this challenge will be compounded. In this study, RAND examines the technical feasibility of different cycle lengths and their effect on the forward presence of Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. The authors assess several one- and two-deployment cycles, assuming a deployment length of six months and a time-between-deployments length equal to twice the duration of the previous deployment. The study also presents an analysis of the impact of different cycles on managing shipyard workloads. Among many findings, RAND concludes that shorter cycles can increase the forward presence of the carrier fleet and help level shipyard workloads. However, these shorter cycles will decrease fleet surge readiness. Longer, two-deployment cycles can increase forward presence, but may result in shipyard workload complications and deferred-work backlogs.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
1523.0193
by
LaCroix, F. W.
Call Number
359.93834 21
Publication Date
2001
Summary
By 2012, the reactor on the U.S. Navy's only deep-diving research submarine will be exhausted, making it necessary to either refuel the reactor or replace the submarine. If the Navy opts for a new submarine, what capabilities should it retain and what capabilities should be added? What would be its most important missions and what would be required for it to perform those missions? In this report, the authors worked with panels of qualified scientists, defense experts, and naval officers to develop a concept of operation for a possible replacement platform, analyzing which military and scientific missions should have the highest priorities. The authors conclude by offering a list of the highest-priority missions and two design concepts that would best be able to achieve them.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
1520.3834
by
Hynes, Michael, 1950-
Call Number
359.030973 21
Publication Date
2002
Summary
This text presents an analytic approach for the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) for making business-planning decisions involving its activities, products, markets, technologies, people and facilities with a view towards organizational realignment within the context of the Navy in 2007.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
1377.3134
by
Birkler, J. L., 1944-
Call Number
359.94835 21
Publication Date
1998
Summary
This report documents the methods and findings of RAND research on the adequacy of the defense industrial base to support further construction of aircraft carriers and on the cost, schedule, and technology issues associated with building the next carrier, designated CVN 77. If the current carrier force size of 12 ships is to be maintained and if a decay in the quality of basic capabilities is to be avoided, CVN 77 cannot be started more than a year or so beyond the currently planned date of 2002. The earlier CVN is started, the less it will cost. Increasing the build duration from the planned 6.5 years to 8.5 years will also reduce costs. However, timing should not greatly affect the survival of suppliers of carrier components. The report recommends beginning ship fabrication before 2002 (which could save hundreds of millions of dollars); ordering contractor-furnished equipment in advance of shipyard start (a savings of tens of millions); and investment in R & D directed toward adapting production processes and engineering improvements that could reduce the cost of carrier construction, operation and maintenance, and manning. In fact, the costs involved in building and operating carriers are so huge that the Navy should consider establishing a stable annual R & D funding level for these ships. Appendixes to the report provide supporting data.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
1021.4239
by
Hallion, Richard P.
Call Number
951.904245
Publication Date
2011
Summary
& Ldquo;In The Naval Air War in Korea, Dr. Hallion has captured the fact, feel- ing, and fancy of a very important conflict in aviation history, in- cluding the highly significant facets of the transition from piston to jet-propelled combat aircraft. & rdquo; & mdash;Norman Polmar, author of Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 18th Edition.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
3.4732
by
Glass, James C.
Call Number
359.00973 23
Publication Date
2013
Summary
So you want to become a Chief Petty Officer in the United States Navy? That is a good and noble goal, but wishful thinking won't cut it. It takes drive, initiative, and hard work. Anyone who has undergone the transition from Sailor to Chief Petty Officer will tell you it is a lot tougher and more challenging than most Sailors imagine. James Glass' in-depth and informative The Ultimate Chief Petty Officer Guidebook: Tips, Tactics, and Techniques for Sailors Who are Serious about Becoming a Chief Petty Officer is the perfect step-by-step guide to reach your goal. Some Sailors mistakenly believe t.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
2.8401
by
Felker, Craig C., 1959-
Call Number
359.480973 22
Publication Date
2007
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
2.5835
by
Polmar, Norman.
Call Number
359.00973 22
Publication Date
2009
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
2.3734
by
Schank, John F. (John Frederic), 1946-
Call Number
359.93 22
Publication Date
2007
Summary
For the first time since the design of the first nuclear submarine, the U.S. Navy has no nuclear submarine design program under way, which raises the possibility that design capability could be lost. Such a loss could result in higher costs and delays when the next submarine design is undertaken, as well as risks to system performance and safety. The authors estimate and compare the costs and delays of letting design capability erode vs. those of alternative means of managing the workload and workforce over the gap in design demand and beyond. The authors recommend that the Navy consider stret.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
1.9221
Limit Search Results