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Copyright information Conclusion: The Way Forward The difficulties experienced by most Western governments in assessing and engaging New Western Brotherhood organizations are paradigmatic of the challenges posed by such a complex movement. Conceptualizing a movement that mixes politics and religion, particularly a religion about which most policy makers know little, has proven extremely difficult. In some cases, the Brothers' actions seem to reflect the moderation and pro-integration stance that Western governments are desperately looking for in their Muslim interlocutors. In others, they seem to harbor an agenda and embrace values diametrically opposed to those of a Western liberal democracy. Policy makers, eager to find solutions to urgent problems involving the Muslim community, find themselves in a bind. Many among the pessimists call for policies that would exclude the New Western Brothers from any engagement. Considering them deceitful actors seeking to destroy the very same freedoms that have allowed them to flourish, critics argue that their organizations should be marginalized or even outlawed as subversive, the political wings of a global Islamist insurgency. While highlighting troubling aspects of the Western Brothers' nature and agenda that unquestionably need to be addressed, this position is unrealistic and, arguably, dangerous. Although their claims of representativeness are often overblown, New Western Brotherhood organizations do represent a significant cross-section of the Muslim community. If the aim of a government is to hear all voices, it makes little sense to exclude an important one. Talking only to those Muslim leaders whose positions square with the government's and pretending that more confrontational voices do not exist is hardly a constructive policy. When they act outside of the law, as when they provide financial support to groups designated as terrorist, Western Brotherhood organizations should be prosecuted. But since most of their activities are abundantly within the law, nonviolent Islamists are a reality that cannot be ignored and should be engaged. Moreover, more pragmatically, marginalization could trigger a dangerous radicalization of the movement, pushing it to embrace more extremist positions and perhaps even violence. A diametrically opposite approach, advocated by some optimists, sees the New Western Brothers as reliable partners the state should engage in order to favor integration and stem radicalization among Western Muslims. Only the Brothers, according to some, possess the grassroots reach and the credibility to effectively influence large segments of the Muslim community. On this account, the Brothers, while seeking to maintain the Islamic identity of Western Muslims, have views and aims compatible with those of Western governments. This approach is also problematic. The previous chapters have presented ample evidence showing that the aims of the New Western Brothers do not necessarily correspond to those publicly stated in dialogues with Western establishments. Assigning an almost monopolistic control of the community to a handful of self-appointed leaders whose aims are, at best, unclear seems naïve. It would reinforce the position of the movement within Western Muslim communities, aiding its effort to make its interpretation of Islam mainstream. There is the risk that, thanks to the support of the government, a vocal minority would be able to further marginalize competing forces and exercise undue influence over a community that, for the most part, does not embrace the Brothers' conservative and politicized version of Islam. The potential repercussions of this hypothetical shift for security and social cohesion are debatable, but providing the New Western Brothers with a blank check seems overly optimistic. The experiences of the last few years have led some Western policy makers to consider a third option, which entails cautious engagement of New Western Brotherhood organizations. Most governments are now refuting the monopolistic approach. Increasingly aware of the extreme diversity of Western Muslim communities, they try to speak to a wider range of voices, proactively seeking to connect with traditionally underrepresented groups. Looking beyond the "bearded communalist shepherds" who have often monopolized access to institutions, policy makers are progressively trying to broaden the spectrum of government interlocutors. New Western Brotherhood organizations do represent a section of the community, but their activism and visibility should not be mistaken for universal representativeness. Moreover, there is a growing awareness of the need for a more refined approach. There are indeed significant advantages in not isolating New Western Brotherhood organizations, for example, good results in the security field. And, even though nobody can exactly predict long-term developments, it is arguable that engagement can lead to a moderation of the movement, as Sarkozy believes. Isolation, in contrast, could have negative repercussions, further radicalizing the organizations and allowing them to be seen as "martyrs" in the Muslim community. But engagement needs to be based on a firm understanding of the history, characteristics, connections, modus operandi , and, most important, aims of the Brothers. Only an informed engagement can lead to a realistic and constructive rapport. Finally, many policy makers increasingly understand the difference between engagement and empowerment. Establishing a permanent dialogue and even occasional and limited forms of partnership with New Western Brotherhood organizations can produce several positive outcomes. But entrusting them with undue powers that would give them the keys to the Muslim community appears to be an option that most Western governments are no longer willing to choose. The evolution of the relationship between the British government and the Mawdudist network is, from this point of view, emblematic. Striking the right balance between engagement and empowerment is not easy, but necessary in order to avoid granting legitimacy and influence to organizations with limited representativeness whose agenda is not necessarily compatible with those of Western governments. Crucially important in policy development is the uncertain evolutionary path New Western Brotherhood organizations will follow. The organizations established some forty years ago by the pioneers are undergoing a significant change, as leadership is slowly being passed to a new generation of Western-born activists, who will inevitably add their perspectives. Today it is not unreasonable to speak of some of these organizations as "post-Brotherhood," even though the real meaning of this expression is still to be defined. Will the New Western Brothers become a "Muslim church in Europe, which will pose little or no security threat, but will push for conservative moral and social values," as French scholar Olivier Roy theorizes? Or are the pro-democracy and pro-integration statements of the new generation just a carefully devised smokescreen for the movement's real aims of a "Civilization-Jihadist Process," as outlined by Akram and other older Brotherhood leaders? Only time will tell, and it is not unlikely that different wings of the movement will go in separate and even opposing directions. But for the time being, given this uncertainty, a policy of cautious and informed engagement appears to be the most appropriate. ... COPYRIGHT NOTICE : Copyright (c) 2010 Columbia University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher, except for reading and browsing via the World Wide Web. Users are not permitted to mount this file on any network servers. For more information, please e-mail us or visit the permissions page on our Web site. Excerpted from The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West by Lorenzo Vidino All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.