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Summary
Summary
In this concise and fascinating book, Fawaz A. Gerges argues that Al-Qaeda has degenerated into a fractured, marginal body kept alive largely by the self-serving anti-terrorist bureaucracy it helped to spawn. In The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, Gerges, a public intellectual known widely for his expertise on radical ideologies, including jihadism, argues that the Western powers have become mired in a "terrorism narrative," stemming from the mistaken belief that America is in danger of a devastating attack by a crippled al-Qaeda. To explain why al-Qaeda is no longer a threat, he provides a briskly written history of the organization, showing its emergence from the disintegrating local jihadist movements of the mid-1990s-not just the Afghan resistance of the 1980s, as many believe-in "a desperate effort to rescue a sinking ship by altering its course." During this period, Gerges interviewed many jihadis, gaining a first-hand view of the movement that bin Laden tried to reshape by internationalizing it. Gerges reveals that transnational jihad has attracted but a small minority within the Arab world and possesses no viable social and popular base. Furthermore, he shows that the attacks of September 11, 2001, were a major miscalculation--no "river" of fighters flooded from Arab countries to defend al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, as bin Laden expected. The democratic revolutions that swept the Middle East in early 2011 show that al-Qaeda today is a non-entity which exercises no influence over Arabs' political life.Gerges shows that there is a link between the new phenomenon of homegrown extremism in Western societies and the war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan-Pakistan, and that homegrown terror exposes the structural weakness, not strength, of bin Laden's al-Qaeda. Gerges concludes that the movement has splintered into feuding factions, neutralizing itself more effectively than any Predator drone. Forceful, incisive, and written with extensive inside knowledge, this book will alter the debate on global terrorism.
Author Notes
Fawaz A. Gerges, the Director of the Middle East Centre at the London School of Economics, is Professor of Middle Eastern Politics and International Relations. His books include Journey of the Jihadist and The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global.
Reviews (2)
Choice Review
Noted Middle East scholar Gerges (London School of Economics and Political Science) offers a compelling argument in order to move past the terrorism narrative that dominates US national security thinking. Prone to exaggeration at times (e.g., number of private contractors working intelligence, significance of the 9/11 attack relative to Soviet actions during the Cold War, and proliferation of drone strikes), Gerges follows in the tradition of John Mueller, who sees the inflation of the threat of terrorism negatively impacting national security. While bin Laden's death is an important milestone, Gerges argues that al Qaeda's relevance was declining due to violence led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, the group's inability to execute further attacks, and being made redundant by popular uprisings during the Arab Awakening that saw the end of authoritarian regimes in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia. This view is strengthened by the use of prominent Islamic scholars who critiqued the 9/11 attacks and challenged bin Laden's motives. Gerges notes that viewing al Qaeda through a cultural/religious lens has given unnecessary life to the group and that analysts must view the group through a political/historical lens to appreciate the increasing irrelevance of al Qaeda. Summing Up: Recommended. General readers and undergraduate students of all levels. D. S. Reveron Naval War College
Library Journal Review
Gerges (director, Middle East Ctr., London Sch. of Economics; Journey of the Jihadist) argues that the U.S. military and foreign policy establishment are entangled within a "terrorism narrative" sustained by an inflated, distorted view of al-Qaeda's operational capabilities and global reach, which he contends were drastically degraded even before Osama bin Laden's death. The peaceful character of some recent revolutions in the Arab world appear to add weight to Gerges's primary assertion, one of the major strands of this work, that al-Qaeda has long since lost any significant support or legitimacy, in part because of the indiscriminate slaughter of Muslims instigated by al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq, and that their ideology and tactics have been resoundingly rejected by large segments of the Arab populace. Gerges also focuses on al-Qaeda's role in the increasing instability in Yemen and its influence on "homegrown" radicals in America. VERDICT A cogent examination of al-Qaeda's historical trajectory that integrates major recent developments into its comprehensive analysis. This work will appeal to readers with an advanced grasp of Middle Eastern history and counterterrorism studies. It is not for general readers, although they may have seen Gerges speak accessibly as an expert on cable news.-Dennis J. Seese, American Univ. Lib., Washington, DC (c) Copyright 2011. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.