by
Haynes, Christine, 1970- author.
Call Number
944.061 23
Publication Date
2018
Summary
Contrary to popular understanding, the Napoleonic Wars did not end in 1815 at Waterloo. The battle was only the beginning of a long and complex transition to peace. To end this first "total" war, the powers allied against Napoleon developed a new approach to peace-making: a military occupation designed not to conquer territory, but rather to guarantee that the defeated nation reconstruct itself and repay the damages it had caused. Our Friends the Enemies provides the first comprehensive history of the post-Napoleonic "occupation of guarantee." From 1815 to 1818, a multinational occupation force of 150,000 men was stationed in seven departments along the northeastern frontier, at the expense of the French government. Recounting the experience of both occupiers and occupied, the author shows that while the occupation inevitably involved some violence, it also promoted considerable exchange and reconciliation between the French and their former enemies. Although its significance has long been overlooked, the post-Napoleonic occupation of guarantee foreshadowed later efforts at postwar reconstruction, including the Allied occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II.--
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
54896.1641
View Other Search Results
by
Naimark, Norman M. author
Call Number
940.554 23
Publication Date
2019
Summary
The Cold War division of Europe was not inevitable--the acclaimed author of Stalin's Genocides shows how postwar Europeans fought to determine their own destinies. Was the division of Europe after World War II inevitable? In this powerful reassessment of the postwar order in Europe, Norman Naimark suggests that Joseph Stalin was far more open to a settlement on the continent than we have thought. Through revealing case studies from Poland and Yugoslavia to Denmark and Albania, Naimark recasts the early Cold War by focusing on Europeans' fight to determine their future. As nations devastated by war began rebuilding, Soviet intentions loomed large. Stalin's armies controlled most of the eastern half of the continent, and in France and Italy, communist parties were serious political forces. Yet Naimark reveals a surprisingly flexible Stalin, who initially had no intention of dividing Europe. During a window of opportunity from 1945 to 1948, leaders across the political spectrum, including Juho Kusti Paasikivi of Finland, Wladyslaw Gomulka of Poland, and Karl Renner of Austria, pushed back against outside pressures. For some, this meant struggling against Soviet dominance. For others, it meant enlisting the Americans to support their aims. The first frost of Cold War could be felt in the tense patrolling of zones of occupation in Germany, but not until 1948, with the coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, did the familiar polarization set in. The split did not become irreversible until the formal division of Germany and establishment of NATO in 1949. In illuminating how European leaders deftly managed national interests in the face of dominating powers, Stalin and the Fate of Europe reveals the real potential of an alternative trajectory for the continent.--
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
0.0460
View Other Search Results
Limit Search Results
Narrowed by: