by
Davis, Lynn E. (Lynn Etheridge), 1943-
Call Number
355.00973 22
Publication Date
2003
Summary
How is the U.S. Army changing to fulfill its role in light of the new national security strategy? How must it change further to better accomplish its manifold and varied missions? How did the attacks of September 11, 2001, alter or accelerate the need for change? Is the Army's far-reaching program for change known as the Army Transformation on the right track? Fourteen RAND analysts with broad experience in strategic and Army planning have undertaken to answer these questions. In this book, the authors use nine chapters to examine the Army's role in the offensive war on terrorism; the Army's homeland security needs; the implications for the Army of the increase in emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region; the Army's role in coalition operations; the unfinished business of jointness-the lessons to be learned from recent Army operations and how the Army can better prepare for the future; the Army's deployability, logistical, and personnel challenges; and whether the Army can afford the Transformation as currently envisaged. These chapters are bracketed by a concise introduction, a description of the new national security strategy and the Army's place in it, and a succinct summary of the authors' conclusions. This book is nothing less than a call for the Army to change and a prescription for what needs to be done.
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by
Vick, Alan.
Call Number
355.130973 21
Publication Date
2002
Summary
To better understand the requirement for strategic responsiveness, as well as what is achievable, this study sought to answer the following questions: Can the Air Force meet the Army's 4-day deployment goal? What combination of deployment and basing options would maximize the strategic responsiveness of new Army forces? How much unambiguous warning does the United States usually have before it initiates military operations? How much of this time will civilian decisionmakers typically consume in their deliberations before ordering deployment of military forces? Are large U.S. forces likely to deploy globally or just to certain regions? At what depths from the littoral might U.S. forces have to operate? To assess deployment and basing options, the study team developed a simple spreadsheet that calculated transit times, loading and unloading times, and airfield throughput. It used military planning factors to determine aircraft usage rates, and maximum loads and ranges, and it drew on a variety of historical materials and interviews for the broader analysis of strategic responsiveness. This report concludes that the Stryker Brigade cannot deploy by air or sea from bases in the United States to key regions in 4 days. Deployment times range from 9 days (Colombia) to 21 days (Afghanistan). Even if unlimited numbers of aircraft were available, airlift would still be constrained by the condition of receiving airfields in most scenarios. In some scenarios, the brigade would close as rapidly with sealift but still fall well short of the 4-day goal. However, using combinations of airlift and fast sealift to move forces from forward bases or preposition sites, forces could reach key regions in 5 to 9 days and most of the globe could be covered in two weeks--a great improvement over historic deployment times for motorized forces.
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