by
Paul, Christopher, 1971-
Call Number
355.0218 22
Publication Date
2010
Summary
Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949, as well as the subject of countless historical and contemporary studies. Contemporary discourse on the subject is voluminous and often contentious, but to date there has been a dearth of systematic evidence supporting the counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches, practices, and tenets that make for successful operations. Relying on a collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, along with a bank of factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, several commonalities emerge. For instance, the data show that good COIN practices tend to "run in packs" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict. The importance of popular support is confirmed, but the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success. Twenty distinct approaches to COIN are rigorously tested against the historical record, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations.
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Electronic Resources
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0.0484
by
Paul, Christopher, 1971-
Call Number
355.0218 22
Publication Date
2010
Summary
"This monograph presents detailed case histories for each of the COIN [counterinsurgency] campaigns examined in the analysis. A companion volume, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, describes the qualitative comparative approach, presents findings from the overall analyses, and explains the study's case selection and methodology in more detail. It also presents an overview and in-depth assessments of the key approaches, practices, and factors that feature prominently in successful COIN operations. The full case data can be downloaded at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG964/."--Page iii.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
0.0455
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by
Stearns Lawson, Brooke.
Call Number
355.02180723 R245 22
Publication Date
2010
Summary
"Successful counterinsurgency (COIN) requires the integration of security and civil COIN to create conditions that allow the population to choose between the government and insurgents, eliminate the grievances that gave rise to the insurgency, and present the population with choices that are more attractive than what the insurgents can offer. Building on a framework for integrating civil and military counterinsurgency first described in Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency, this volume presents an approach to the civil component of counterinsurgency that builds on detailed background, context analysis, and threat analysis to identify and develop critical civil COIN activities. It illustrates this approach using three case studies: Nangarhar province in Afghanistan, Nord-Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Al Anbar province in Iraq. The approach builds on the best aspects of existing conflict assessment methodologies and adds new elements developed specifically for this project. The resulting framework goes beyond the strategic and operational decisions related to designing a program that is appropriate for a given conflict context."--Page 4 of cover.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
0.0484
by
Connable, Ben.
Call Number
355.0218 22
Publication Date
2010
Summary
"This study tested conventional wisdom about how insurgencies end against the evidence from 89 insurgencies. It compares a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 89 insurgency case studies with lessons from insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) literature. While no two insurgencies are the same, the authors find that modern insurgencies last about ten years and that a government's chances of winning may increase slightly over time. Insurgencies are suited to hierarchical organization and rural terrain, and sanctuary is vital to insurgents. Insurgent use of terrorism often backfires, and withdrawal of state sponsorship can cripple an insurgency, typically leading to its defeat. Inconsistent support to either side generally presages defeat for that side, although weak insurgencies can still win. Anocracies (pseudodemocracies) rarely succeed against insurgencies. Historically derived force ratios are neither accurate nor predictive, and civil defense forces are very useful for both sides. Key indicators of possible trends and tipping points in an insurgency include changes in desertions, defections, and the flow of information to the COIN effort. The more parties in an insurgency, the more likely it is to have a complex and protracted ending. There are no COIN shortcuts."--Rand web site.
Format:
Electronic Resources
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0.0634
by
Gompert, David C.
Call Number
355.0218 22
Publication Date
2009
Summary
It is widely agreed that effective civilian relief, reconstruction, and development work can help convince people to support their government against insurgency. Knowing this, insurgents will target such work, threatening both those who perform it and those who benefit from it. Too often, the result is a postponement of efforts to improve government and serve the population until contested territory has been cleared of insurgents. This can lead to excessive reliance on force to defeat insurgents - at best, delaying and, at worst, preventing success. Unsatisfied with this general state of affairs, a RAND team with combined security and development expertise set out to learn how 'civilian counterinsurgency' (civil COIN) could be conducted more safely in the face of active insurgency, when it can do the most good.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
0.0442
by
Rabasa, Angel.
Call Number
355.0218 22
Publication Date
2007
Summary
As insurgent threats evolve and assume new forms, the United States must also evolve in its ability to counter potentially prolonged threats in several parts of the world. Because of the potential for global reach in contemporary insurgencies, the ability to draw on lessons learned from past counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns using different historical cases can be valuable, helping current and future leaders prevent a repetition of mistakes and building a foundation on which to build contemporary responses. To this end, six historic COIN operations from the 19th and 20th centuries are examine.
Format:
Electronic Resources
Relevance:
0.0579
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